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Abstract
The last several weeks have seen a flurry of important developments in antitrust
enforcement, with major decisions in one merger and one joint venture case, an
important Federal Trade Commission policy statement about disgorgement and
restitution remedies, and an announced FTC challenge to a consummated merger.
Each of these developments is significant standing alone; collectively, they reflect
extremely active Justice Department and FTC antitrust enforcement programs,
with the agencies at times adopting more aggressive positions than some might
have expected from a Republican administration.
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The last several weeks have seen a flurry of important developments in antitrust enforcement, with major
decisions in one merger and one joint venture case, an important Federal Trade Commission policy state-
ment about disgorgement and restitution remedies, and an announced FTC challenge to a consummated
merger.  Each of these developments is significant standing alone; collectively, they reflect extremely active
Justice Department and FTC antitrust enforcement programs, with the agencies at times adopting more
aggressive positions than some might have expected from a Republican administration.
The Label Stock Case:  A Coordinated Effects Renais-
sance?
On July 26, 2003, Judge Zagel of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted
the Justice Department’s motion preliminarily to enjoin the
proposed acquisition of the number three U.S. label stock
supplier, MACtac, by the second largest supplier, UPM-
Kymmene.1  The parties abandoned the transaction soon
thereafter.
This is the first time in many years that the government
has won a litigated merger challenge based on a “coordi-
nated effects” theory.  Although the agencies had in recent
years focused on “unilateral effects” in merger enforcement,
senior DoJ officials have announced a renewed emphasis
on assessing whether a transaction threatens supplier coor-
dination.2  The agencies’ primary reliance on unilateral ef-
fects may have reflected, in part, the relatively well-devel-
oped and accepted tools for assessing whether a merger is
likely to permit the combined firm to raise prices by itself.
By contrast, coordinated effects analysis has long labored
under substantial doctrinal confusion and imprecision.  In
particular, although it is generally accepted that certain
market characteristics tend to make coordination more or
less likely, until recently there has been little learning about
how to evaluate whether a particular merger is likely to af-
fect suppliers’ ability and incentives to reach terms of coor-
dination and detect and punish deviations therefrom.  Re-
cent analytical advances and experience gained from pros-
1 U.S. v. UPM-Kymmene Oyj, No. 03 C 2528 (July 26, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201100/201196.htm, at ¶ 52.  Unlike with most
merger cases that DoJ brings, the District Court did not consolidate preliminary injunction proceedings with trial on the merits.
2 See, e.g., Jaret Seiberg, “Antitrust Goes Back to the Future,” The Deal (August 13, 2003) (reporting on speech by Assistant Attorney General R.
Hewitt Pate in which Pate stressed recent DoJ focus on coordinated effects); Charles James, “Rediscovering Coordinated Effects” (Aug. 13, 2002) at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200124.htm.
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ecuting many international cartels,3 however, seem to be
giving the agencies greater confidence that they can accu-
rately identify particular mergers likely to lead to coordi-
nation — and then sell courts on coordinated effects theo-
ries in close cases.
The label stock case well illustrates the agencies’ in-
creasing comfort in relying on coordinated effects.  This
was not a three-two merger, or otherwise an immediately
obvious candidate for a challenge.  Although, by combin-
ing the second and third players, the transaction would have
resulted in two suppliers controlling about 70 percent of
the label stock market, there would have remained a sub-
stantial third player (about 10 percent share) and a signifi-
cant competitive fringe comprised of several small suppli-
ers.
DoJ nonetheless convinced the court that the acquisi-
tion threatened to stop or slow a trend of decreasing indus-
try prices, largely because it consolidated most of the
industry’s excess capacity with two leading players.  The
court found that the smaller suppliers would lack the ex-
cess capacity and incentives necessary to preserve the in-
tense competition present before the acquisition.
We anticipate that DoJ’s success in this case will en-
courage the agencies further to step up their attention to
coordinated effects.  Parties contemplating mergers in con-
centrated industries should expect, in particular, closer
agency scrutiny of how combining the merging parties may
affect incentives and ability to coordinate.  As coordinated
effects analysis becomes more sophisticated, we may see
quick rules of thumb for evaluating the likelihood of agency
concern — such as HHI indices — become less reliable.
Three Tenors:  Truncated Rule of Reason and Parent
Non-Competes
In a unanimous opinion authored by Chairman Timo-
thy Muris, the FTC applied a truncated rule of reason analy-
sis and condemned limited restrictions on parents compet-
ing with a joint venture.4  Polygram and Warner Communi-
cations had respectively marketed recordings and video-
tapes based on the Three Tenors concerts at the 1990 and
1994 World Cups.  For the 1998 World Cup concert, how-
ever, they formed a joint venture to produce and sell re-
cordings and videotapes.  After initial sales of the 1998
concert products proved disappointing, Polygram and
Warner mutually agreed to a ten-week moratorium on ad-
vertising and discounting their competing 1990 and 1994
concert products.
The FTC devoted a good deal of its opinion to consid-
ering the appropriate analytical framework for evaluating
agreements between competitors.  It concluded that the case
law, including the Supreme Court’s decision in California
Dental Association, 526 U.S. 756 (1999), supports a return
to the truncated rule analysis that the FTC first used in
Massachusetts Board of Registration in Optometry, 110
F.T.C. 549 (1988), and later abandoned.
The Commission then held that both the advertising
and discounting restrictions were “inherently suspect” and
therefore properly evaluated under a “quick look,” rather
than a full rule of reason analysis which balances any pro
and anti-competitive effects from the restrictions.  Poly-
gram claimed that the restrictions were necessary to keep
the parents from free riding off the joint venture’s promo-
tional activities through increased sales of their respective
competing Three Tenors products, and thereby ensure effi-
cient promotion of the joint venture products.  The Com-
mission declared, however, that this rationale went “far
beyond the range of justifications that are cognizable under
the antitrust laws,” and served only to shield the joint ven-
ture “from legitimate interbrand competition.”  Despite
holding the restrictions illegal under a quick look, the Com-
mission nonetheless went on also to apply a fuller rule of
reason analysis.  It found that the restrictions had, in fact,
lessened competition and were not reasonably necessary to
promote the joint venture efficiently.
The Commission’s opinion could potentially have far-
reaching consequences.  Courts have generally viewed re-
strictions on parents competing with their joint venture as
ancillary to the venture and reviewed them under a rule of
reason standard that focuses principally on whether the re-
strictions are overbroad in terms of scope and duration.
Here, however, the Commission used a quick-look analysis
to condemn a very narrow, short-term covenant not to com-
pete that was arguably less restrictive than many commonly
upheld non-competes involving joint venture parents.
Three Tenors is subject to appeal.  It remains to be
seen whether, if affirmed, the opinion portends a fundamen-
tal shift in standards for evaluating ancillary restraints that
goes beyond the particular facts of the case.  In the mean-
time, parties to joint ventures and other collaborations be-
tween competitors and their counsel are well advised to
study the FTC’s opinion carefully and consider whether and
how it might bear on the analysis of any ancillary restraints.
3 See, e.g., William J. Kolasky, “Coordinated Effects in Merger Review:  From Dead Frenchmen to Beautiful Minds and Mavericks,” (April 24, 2002) at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/11050.htm; Jonathan B. Baker, “Mavericks, Mergers and Exclusivity:  Proving Coordinated Effects Under the Antitrust
Laws,” 77 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 133 (2002).
4 In the Matter of Polygram Holding, Inc., et al., FTC Docket No. 9298 (July 24, 2003), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/polygramopinion.pdf.
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FTC Policy Statement on Disgorgement and Restitution:
From the Wrongdoer Come the Spoils?
On July 25, the FTC issued a unanimous statement clari-
fying its policy on the use of disgorgement and restitution
remedies in antitrust cases.5   The statement underscores
that, in appropriate antitrust cases, the Commission will seek
disgorgement of profits or restitution to victims.  The Com-
mission made clear, however, that it does not view
disgorgement and restitution as routine remedies in anti-
trust cases and will continue to rely mostly on more tradi-
tional sanctions like civil fines, criminal penalties, and in-
junctions against future illegal conduct.  (We note that the
Justice Department lacks the statutory authority to seek
disgorgement and restitution on which the FTC relies.)
 The statement comes after two recent cases where the
FTC obtained disgorgement of profits from antitrust viola-
tions.  One case involved an alleged conspiracy to obtain
monopoly power through exclusive supply agreements in
the pharmaceutical industry, FTC v. Mylan Labs, Inc., No.
1:98CV03114 (TFH) (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 2001); the other grew
out of a merger to monopoly accompanied by withholding
of documents from the FTC, FTC v. The Hearst Trust, No.
1:01CV00734 (TJP) (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2001).
As the FTC’s statement explains, disgorgement is “de-
signed to deprive the wrongdoer of his unjust enrichment
and to deter others from future violations.”  Restitution
serves “different but often complementary purposes.”  It
“is intended to restore the victims of a violation to the posi-
tion they would have been in without the violation.”
In deciding whether to seek disgorgement or restitu-
tion in particular cases, the Commission will consider three
main factors.  First, the underlying conduct must be a clear
violation of the antitrust laws; that is, “a reasonable party
should expect that the conduct at issue would likely be found
to be illegal.”  The statement makes clear, however, that the
violation need not necessarily constitute a per se offense.
Indeed, neither the conduct in Mylan nor in Hearst was il-
legal per se.
Second, there must be a reasonable basis for calculat-
ing the amount of disgorgement or restitution, although
undue precision will not be required.
5 Federal Trade Commission, “Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases,” (July 25, 2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/disgorgementfrn.htm.
6 FTC News Release, “FTC Charges Aspen Technology’s Acquisition Of Hyprotech, LTD. Was Anticompetitive,” (Aug. 7, 2003), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/08/aspen.htm;  Administrative Complaint, In the Matter of Aspen Technology, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9310 (Aug. 6, 2003) at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/08/aspencmp.pdf.
7 The FTC has also recently challenged two other consummated mergers.  See In the Matter of MSC.Software Corp., FTC Docket No. 9299 (Aug. 14,
2002) (consent to divestiture before commencement of administrative proceedings after FTC alleged that non-reportable merger created monopoly in certain
markets), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/08/mscsoftwareagee.pdf, and FTC v. The Hearst Trust, The Hearst Corp. and First Data Bank, Inc., Civ. No. 01-00734
(D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2001) (ordering divestiture of acquired company when failure to produce required documents allegedly concealed anticompetitive effects from
FTC), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/12/hearstfinalorder.pdf.
Third, the Commission will consider whether it makes
sense to seek disgorgement or restitution in light of other
available remedies, including private civil actions, civil
fines, and criminal proceedings.  For instance, if it seems
unlikely that victims will be able to recover their losses
through private suits, the FTC will be more likely to seek
restitution for them.  Similarly, disgorgement may be ap-
propriate if private actions or civil or criminal penalties will
be inadequate to strip the defendant of all its illegal gains.
When private actions or other enforcement mechanisms are
likely sufficiently to punish the wrongdoer and fully com-
pensate victims, the Commission will be less likely to seek
disgorgement or restitution.
Aspen Technologies:  FTC Challenge to Another Con-
summated Transaction
The FTC announced on August 7 that it has authorized
the filing of an administrative complaint seeking to unwind
Aspen Technologies, Inc.’s March 2002 acquisition of
Hyprotech, Ltd.6  The Commission alleges that the transac-
tion combined two of the three largest developers and sup-
pliers of certain process engineering simulation software,
gave the combined firm between 67 and 80-percent market
shares in relevant markets, and left only one other mean-
ingful competitor (which has been declining in importance).
The acquisition, the Commission claims, threatens to en-
able Aspen Technologies unilaterally to increase prices and
decrease innovation.  (Aspen Technologies has announced
that it will contest the Commission’s allegations in FTC
administrative proceedings.)
Aspen Technologies comes less than two months after
an FTC administrative law judge ordered Chicago Bridge
& Iron Co. to unwind its already consummated acquisition
of assets from Pitt-Des Moines, Inc.7  (For a discussion of
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. and FTC challenges to con-
summated mergers generally, see WCP Antitrust Update of
June 27, 2003, at http://www.wilmer.com/docs/news_items/
Antitrust%20Update%2006-27-03.pdf.)  Unlike Chicago
Bridge & Iron, however, the Aspen Technologies transac-
tion was not notifiable under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.
The FTC investigation of the transaction had been ongoing
for 15 months, but it is unclear whether, as in Chicago
Bridge & Iron, the parties were on notice of an investiga-
tion when they closed.
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In the press release announcing the complaint, the new
Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, Susan
Creighton, commented that “[a]lthough the fact that a merger
has been consummated increases the complexity of the
Commission’s decision to seek relief, that hurdle is not suf-
ficient for the agency to forgo a challenge to a transaction
that is likely to lead to anticompetitive effects.”  This ech-
oes statements by her predecessor, Joseph Simons, in con-
nection with the administrative law judge’s order in Chi-
cago Bridge & Iron.  Although it may be two or three years
before the FTC’s challenge is finally resolved, Aspen Tech-
nologies is another reminder that the possibility of an agency
investigation and challenge does not end at closing, espe-
cially when the transaction is not subject to HSR notifica-
tion.
Please contact us if you would like further informa-
tion about these developments or would like information
about any other issue of U.S. or foreign antitrust or
competition law.
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